Three years after the youth revolution against the rule of Ali
Abdullah Saleh, the country’s political and social forces are cautiously
pursuing the path of dialogue — a path where political, security,
social and economic mines have existed for more than 30 years. There is
still great hope that the process to bring about change will come to an
end by promoting a historic solution that results in a new social
contract, taking Yemen toward a future where the deep-rooted legacy and
complexities of the past are overcome.
Between unity and partition
The most ancient [eras] that historians have cited in the history of
Yemen are the Kingdom of Saba, the Kingdom of Hadramaut and the
Himyarite Kingdom, which lasted until the 6th century AD.
In those times, Yemen experienced the first political unity that
consisted of Saba, Dhu Raydan, Hadramaut, Yamnat and Tehama. Until
today, political and social balances in the country have been governed
by tribal and regional wills which unite the country when they reach a
consensus and divide it when they collide.
Today, Yemeni political and social forces are trying to reach a
consensus to achieve unity. They have taken their first steps through
the National Dialogue, which took 300 days and resulted in several
outcomes, most notably the adoption of the idea of the federal state,
which participants in the dialogue hope will represent the introduction
of state-building on the basis of unity, while others warn that it will
be an introduction to a new partition.
Presently, the march for the National Dialogue is experiencing an
important milestone. The national committee tasked with the drafting of
the constitution continues its work in the hope that it will incorporate
the outcome of the dialogue into a constitutional text. Yemenis will
vote on this constitution in a referendum in the first quarter of 2015,
so that the political process can move toward elections that promote a
new legitimacy and replace the Gulf Initiative.
If political forces believe in the need to move forward with the
democratic transitional process, there are factors slowing the process
down out of fear that dialogue derails.
The most prominent factor is probably the obstruction attempt by the
former president, who has become immune via the Gulf Initiative, and his
heavy legacy to Yemeni society — a legacy of conflict, settlement of
political and regional scores and terrorism threats in a place where
internal, regional and international interests intersect.
In an interview with As-Safir, as one of the active figures in the
National Dialogue Conference, Abdul Malik al-Mekhlafi, veteran
politician and senior leader of the Nasserite Unionist Party, provides
his interpretation of the political scene in Yemen, the process for
democratic transition in the country and the obstacles to change.
The new legitimacy
The National Dialogue in Yemen is a continuation of the Gulf
Initiative that ended the political crisis in the country after the
revolutionary youth movement erupted in 2011.
It has been clear since the initiative was first suggested that it
is a temporary solution and that oppositionists feared it would pave the
way for the return of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule. They intensified
efforts to start and complete the dialogue so that this temporary
solution would turn into to what Mekhlafi describes as a “historical
solution.”
Mekhlafi said that, from the beginning, interim President Abed Rabbo
Mansour Hadi prioritized bringing about a deep change that would lead to
a change in the current structure through the success of the National
Dialogue Conference.
Mekhlafi said that so far there has been remarkable progress in
dialogue — although this movement has seemed slow — considering the
various obstructions. He explained that this process had moved toward
the adoption of the constitution, with the national commission working
on the drafting process before the referendum, provided that
presidential and local elections were held before parliamentary
elections.
He added that, with the adoption of the constitution, the Gulf
Initiative would end and a new tripartite legitimacy would be
established. The legitimacy of the constitution would put an end to the
consensual formula upon which the initiative had been based. The
legitimacy of the president would result in a president with full
powers. The representative legitimacy would be promoted first with local
elections and culminate in the parliamentary elections. Thus, the
process for change in the state system would be achieved from the top
and bottom.
Mekhlafi said the elections would open the door to a new
transitional phase, as the new constitution would include some of the
provisions related to one or more electoral rounds (the share of the
south in the next parliament, control over the implementation of the
dialogue outcomes and the border of the regions).
Federation of unity or partition ?
The most prominent outcome of the dialogue conference is probably
the adoption of the idea of the federal state, which will consist of
six federal regions. Opinions are divided inside and outside Yemen over
this formula. Some see it as a historical solution that guarantees the
unity of Yemen ; others fear it would be an introduction to the
country’s partition.
Mekhlafi supports the first opinion. He believes the idea of a
federal state is a guarantee of unity for two reasons. First, the
practices of the Saleh regime have led the issue of the south toward a
critical situation. Calls for secession have emerged. Thus, “a
federation provides a solution to the issue of the south in a way that
satisfies the south and preserves unity,” particularly since the
proposed division of the regions takes into account the overlap between
the north and south, as it is based on the boundaries of unity and not
those of northern and southern Yemen.
Second, centralization in Yemen was tribal and political, with
certain tribes in certain areas controlling the rest of Yemen. This
poses a constant threat to unity. In contrast, decentralization will
contribute to the building of a state based on citizenship and equal
status, allowing for the achievement of balance and ruling out monopoly.
Mekhlafi said that dividing the regions was not made on a sectarian,
political or historical basis, but rather on objective economic and
administrative considerations. He said there were six overlapping
regions between the north and south, and that this division was only
temporary. The constitution would include texts to reconsider this
division if necessary. Mekhlafi said that those objecting to the project
were not against the idea itself but rather the form of the division.
Obstacles to change
Although parties to the dialogue are working in good faith to sail
the ship of change safely to the shore, the devilish small details and
the remnants of the old regime continue to delay the democratic
transition.
Mekhlafi believes there are two reasons behind this delay : first is
the situation that prevailed in the country during the era of Saleh,
while the second reason is closely linked to the initiative, which was
the basis for the National Dialogue Conference.
Mekhlafi said that the process of change often fell under two scenarios : a strong state and a failed state.
When political power collapses in a strong state, the process of
democratic transition is easier given the strong pillars that can be
invoked. Conversely, when political power collapses in a failed state,
the process of democratic transition becomes delayed by double
requirements. People need to re-unite and the state needs to be rebuilt,
which makes the transition period longer, as is happening in Yemen
today.
On the other hand, Mekhlafi considers the Gulf Initiative to be
closer to a political deal, limited to the idea of partnership between
the ruling party and the opposition within a unity government, while
granting immunity to the former president and making the vice president a
transitional consensual president with limited powers, paving the way
for new presidential elections within 60 days.
Moreover, he believes that the first version of the Gulf Initiative
would bring Saleh back to rule, but the developments imposed a certain
mechanism for the initiative to be implemented, making it broader and
more detailed. Thus, the political settlement turned into a historic one
that is currently being implemented.
Saleh’s illusions
“The worst part of the initiative is the only part left, which is the
immunity granted to Saleh and the formation of the government based on
division,” Mekhlafi said.
He added that granting immunity to Saleh allowed him to try to
disrupt the National Dialogue, especially since he continues to have
considerable influence in the centers of power in the Yemeni state and
within the General People’s Congress, not to mention the large amounts
of money he possesses.
In this context, Mekhlafi talked about the “coup attempt” that
happened in Yemen this past month under what was known as “the battle of
tires,” when “Saleh took advantage of the people’s suffering from the
oil derivatives crisis and pushed his supporters to attack electricity
networks and oil pipes and block roads with burning tires. He also
mobilized some of the soldiers who support him.”
“The former president still thinks he could go back to power,
whether himself, or through his son,” Mekhlafi said. However, he
emphasized that “all that he could possibly do is create chaos. A coup
is a difficult matter.”
In parallel to street action, Mekhlafi thinks that Saleh is still
capable of disruption and chaos through the current parliament, where
most of the members are from the General People’s Congress.
Mekhlafi explained that the parliament remained because of the
initiative from the Gulf which restrained its powers by making its
resolutions the subject of agreement between the People’s Congress and
the parties of the opposition it represents. In case of any
disagreement, the matter is presented to the president for him to solve.
Even though this mechanism created a constitutional guaranty against
the People’s Congress exclusively making decisions, it gave Saleh’s
party the ability to disable the parliament.
The issue of the south
The issue of the south is considered one of the more important
turning points for the political crisis that has been going on in Yemen
ever since its independence. In spite of accomplishing unity in 1990,
Saleh’s policies have contributed to complicating this issue even more.
This created a civil war that the former president quickly resolved
against the southern Vice President Ali Salim al-Beidh in 1994. The
accumulations over the years following the unity have contributed in the
emergence of calls for division.
Mekhlafi thinks that the historic solution that resulted from the
National Dialogue is starting to become fruitful. The division in the
south is beginning to subside and many Southern Movement leaders are
participating in the dialogue.
In addition to those calls for division, the south of Yemen is under
different threats — most dangerously, the presence of al-Qaeda as a
prominent element in the events taking place.
Mekhlafi said that the danger of al-Qaeda’s presence is a political
matter as much as it is a security matter. He explained there are three
factors that control the matter of al-Qaeda. First of all, the
organization is starting to become a part of Saleh’s game, inside and
outside. The organization is “an American necessity, just like in
Afghanistan.” The name “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” confirms that
Saudi Arabia has something to do with its reinforcement, since the
neighboring kingdom “exports al-Qaeda to Yemen to decrease the danger
within its land,” noting that many al-Qaeda leaders and militants are
Saudi nationals.
Houthis
If federalism is the solution for the southern issue, then the
applied formula did not please the Houthis. They turned into a tough
element in the Yemeni equation after they succeeded in proving their
political and military presence through six wars against Saleh’s regime.
In this context, Mekhlafi indicated that the Houthis want their
region to span to Hajjah district, for sectarian considerations, and
perhaps to Jawf district where there are oil and gas fields. Moreover,
they are demanding a port on the Red Sea. The fact that the Houthis did
not object to the idea perhaps indicates that they might accept a
settlement, especially since the delegations that met with Sayyid Abdul
Malik al-Houthi have asserted to him that the current distribution is
modifiable if need arises in the future.
When explaining the clashes in Yemen between the Houthis and the
armed forces, Mekhlafi considered the issue related to the Houthis’ urge
for growth, which tempted them to try certain options before taking
part in the dialogue process. Perhaps it was an attempt to boost their
gains as part of the dialogue process. He also noted that the issue was
related to settlement of scores from Saleh’s legacy.
Mekhlafi expressed his certainty that the dialogue would lead to
solving the Houthi issue, especially since it was taking an approach
that was different from the agreements that had ended the previous wars.
Those agreements were restricted to cease-fires and the opening of
roads. The current approach, however, includes core issues like looking
into the causes of descending from the mountain and the fate of the
fighters, as well as solutions for the root of the problem.
The road of change in Yemen seems to be riddled with obstacles.
Under these complications, one question remains : Who will protect this
process ? Mekhlafi answered, “The consensus will.”
(12-07-2014 - Wissam Matta)
Lancé le 19 décembre 2011, "Si Proche Orient" est un blog d'information internationale. Sa mission est de couvrir l’actualité du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord avec un certain regard et de véhiculer partout dans le monde un point de vue pouvant amener au débat. "Si Proche Orient" porte sur l’actualité internationale de cette région un regard fait de diversité des opinions, de débats contradictoires et de confrontation des points de vue.Il propose un décryptage approfondi de l’actualité .
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